MPM-F - Emergency Response Part 1 Orange C 15:00 - 16:30
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| Chair(s): Patricia Milligan, Craig Marianno
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MPM-F.1
15:00 The Radiological Operations Support Specialist at Cobalt Magnet 19 WE Irwin*, Vermont Department of Health
Abstract: Cobalt Magnet 19 was an exercise near the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida. The scenario was a catastrophic launch anomaly where the 4.8 kilogram 31.8 TBq Pu-238 radioisotopic heater unit source was boiled in an explosion subsequently releasing the radioactivity into the environment. The three-day exercise engaged numerous players including a Radiological Operations Support Specialist (ROSS) Strike Team. The ROSS served as radiological emergency subject matter experts in Brevard County and Osceola County and worked with FRMAC and State of Florida field teams during environmental surveillance. The ROSS Strike Team Leader will describe some of the many lessons learned in an effort to help all jurisdictions which may confront a similar scenario, including an Am-241 radiological dispersal device. Lessons are also related to nuclear power plant release responses.
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MPM-F.2
15:15 Managing First Responder Dose in Severe Reactor Accidents: The Role for Wearable Selective Shielding G Jaczko*, Senior Nuclear Advisor StemRad, former US NRC Chair
Abstract: Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan, regulatory authorities renewed their focus on the mitigation and response to severe accidents. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently finalized regulations requiring additional mitigation capabilities for beyond design basis, severe accidents. Correspondingly, the nuclear industry developed a program, known as FLEX, to provide on-site and regional emergency equipment stockpiles to address this requirement. Often overlooked is the potential for significant site contamination or radiation during a severe accident that could expose operators and other emergency responders to extremely high doses. With existing protective action guidelines, responders are allowed to receive potentially life-threatening whole-body radiation doses if necessary. With the chaotic nature of a severe accident, utilizing FLEX equipment may require actions that involve life threatening exposures. Wearable selective shielding provides the ability to significantly reduce the likelihood of fatality for individuals undertaking such emergency response actions. This talk will discuss my experiences dealing with the response to the Fukushima accident, especially with regard to the site dose, the operational impact of site contamination and the confusion surrounding appropriate emergency response dose limitations. Then I will review the new mitigation measures required for US nuclear plants, and the improvement in survivability from utilizing wearable selective shielding.
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MPM-F.3
15:30 Risk Informing Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular Reactors and other New Technologies PA Milligan*, US NRC
Abstract: Nuclear power reactors are changing- they are proposing smaller designs and different technologies with passive and inherent safety features consistent with the Commission policy on advanced reactors. These reactors are incorporating "emergency preparedness by design." The NRC is re-evaluating its emergency preparedness regulations in light of these proposed new designs. This presentation will discuss the "hows and whys" of the evolving emergency preparedness regulatory framework.
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MPM-F.4
15:45 Orphan Source Search and Secure Program: Issues, Achievements, Sustainability RA Kahn*, Argonne National Laboratory.
; B McRee, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; J Rolando, Spectral Labs Incorporated; T Taplin, DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration
Abstract: IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources indicates that each State "should ensure that its regulatory body...is prepared to recover and restore appropriate control over orphan sources..." The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security (ORS) Search & Secure (S&S) Program has been a leader in providing support for the detection, identification, recovery and safe storage of orphan and vulnerable radioactive sources and materials. The S&S Program grew from initial cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to develop national strategies for member states to improve control of radioactive sources and materials.
The S&S has proven to be an effective method for improving regulatory capacity within host countries by providing training and instrumentation for detection and recovery of radioactive sources and materials. The issue of sustainability of these capabilities in partner countries are of utmost importance for the Program. Through the development of a state-of-the-art e-learning program, the S&S Program is ensuring sustainability of the concepts and techniques presented through the training courses. Nevertheless, lack of formal training program in many partner countries present additional challenges.
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MPM-F.5
16:00 Passive Neutron Activation Detectors PR Exline*, Georgia Institute of Technology; US Army
; NE Hertel, Georgia Institute of Technology
Abstract: Passive neutron detectors, including activation foils, use neutron absorption reactions with known cross-sections to determine a level of neutron radiation received over time. These reactions, and subsequently activation foils, are chosen because of their reaction cross-sections at various neutron energy levels and the resulting activation products. Different activation foil nuclides have strongly varying neutron cross-sections at different energy levels. By selecting an appropriate set of foils, the energy dependence of the neutron field can be characterized and information about the spectrum and the magnitude of the fluence can be obtained. For the Activation Foil Integrated Detector System (AFIDS), a specific setup is used to distinguish between nuclear weapons detonation leakage spectra. The selection of various elements for use in foils and their dimensions for AFIDS was initially based on informed judgement, but no rigorous optimization has been done. Since this system could be deployed in cities nationwide, cost is a key consideration alongside the ability to distinguish different spectra. This research will provide a method to optimize both the AFIDS detectors, based on ability to differentiate between expected leakage spectra and the cost while maintaining feasibility and reliability. This method will lead to a code which will be generalized for other activation foil applications and spectra. Determining the likely neutron leakage source spectra from a nuclear event as well as providing dozens of localized activation results throughout a target area can help Health Physics professionals plan triage, treatment, and understand likely long-term effects of the detonation.
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MPM-F.6
16:15 Validation of a Dose Assessment Tool to be Used in Loose Contamination Exercises ML Chen*, Texas A&M University
; LD Cochran, Texas A&M University; KM Cook, Texas A&M University; CM Marianno, Texas A&M University; Chen
Abstract: Emergency responders, including search and rescue dogs, could be exposed to loose radioactive material during a mission. As part of a research project at Texas A&M University, 18F was sprayed in a small area where a handler (in protective gear) and a dog conducted simulated search activities. A dose assessment tool, developed by the researchers, was used to estimate doses to the dog, handler, and sprayer. This presentation will introduce the exercise and compare actual and estimated human doses. In the scenario, the sprayer injected and mixed 200 MBq Fludeoxyglucose 18F (FDG) with 470 ml H2O in a commercial weed sprayer. The solution was distributed evenly over a 3 m x 3 m region in 5 min. After 45 min of evaporation, the dog and handler entered the area for a total of 10 and 23 min, respectively. The predicted sprayer dose was 2.8 ± 0.8 microSv to the whole body (WB) and 21.8 ± 7.5 microSv to the hand. The handler's estimated doses were 5.2 ± 0.5 microSv to the WB and 13.4 ± 1.2 microSv to the knee area. Actual WB doses from optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) were 10X greater than estimated (40 ± 6 microSv for each person). The discrepancy between estimated and OSL readings may be due to how badges were handled before the exercise, since "background" OSLs recorded doses of 30 ± 4.5 microSv. Digital personal dosimeter readings were in the same order of magnitude as the estimate (3.8 ± 0.4 microSv and 3.3 ± 1.0 microSv for sprayer and handler, respectively). Actual doses to sprayer's finger dosimeters were < 100 microSv (minimum detectable limit), and to handler's leg OSL was 30 ± 4.5 microSv. Comparing the sprayer's estimated extremity dose to the actual value was difficult, due to exposures being below detectable limits. The handler's leg reading being 2X the estimate may again be from pre-exercise exposure of OSL. Nonetheless, doses were 5,000X below the 0.5 Sv yearly extremity occupational limit and 500X below the 0.05 Sv administrative dose at Texas A&M.
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