WAM-C - Special Session Homeland Security Part 1 Orlando VI 08:30 - 11:45
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| Chair(s): Brooke Buddemeier, Shraddha Rane
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WAM-C.0
08:30 Introduction
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WAM-C.1
08:45 FEMA CBRN RadResponder Network; Transforming Radiological Emergency Response A Leek*, Iowa Department of Public Health
; J Semancik, Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection; BR Buddemeier, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; B Palmer, Chainbridge Technologies; M Powers, Chainbridge Technologies
Abstract: The FEMA CBRN RadResponder Network is having a transformative effect on the radiological/nuclear emergency response community by introducing novel solutions to enduring problems. Recent exercises have demonstrated how federal, state, local and private sector organizations have greatly improved their ability to collect, manage and share real-time radiological data, maintain situational awareness, and establish a common operating picture in multijurisdictional response environments. This free tool provided by FEMA allows a cost effect solution for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies of any size to collect and share data as well as view IMAAC predictions and and federal response support products. This tool has also become a focal point for several other emerging federal initiatives such as the Radiological Operations Support Specialist (ROSS) and the RDD Response Guidance Planning for the first 100 minutes.
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.
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WAM-C.2
09:00 Update on the Removal of Risk from Dirty Bomb J Kamen*, Mount Sinai Hospital
; W Hsu
Abstract: This report is an update on the permanent removal of the risk from using radioactive materials as Radioactive Dispersal Device (RDD) or dirty bomb for malicious purposes.
Due to the unique characteristics of the cesium chloride (Cs-137) used in medical and research irradiators, it is especially susceptible to be used as a dirty bomb. Mount Sinai originally had four such irradiators with cesium sources. To reduce and eventually remove the risk of malicious use of radioactive materials, Mount Sinai at New York City has taken several measures so far. One of the measures was to harden the radioactive material irradiators to make it harder for terrorist to steal such sources. We increased the removal time required to remove the radioactive source so as to allow Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA) to timely respond. The other measure taken was to install or enhance the security equipment with state of the art technology. Mount Sinai also introduced single-person-operation so as to limit the number of people who have access to such radioactive materials from 145 researchers to only a few individuals. The adoption of such measures reduced the radiological risk significantly; however, the best way to remove the permanent risk of radiological security is to replace these high-activity radioactive sources with x-ray technology.
In 2013, Mount Sinai purchased its first x-ray irradiator to investigate the feasibility of using x-ray irradiators instead of cesium irradiators for research purposes for cells and small animals as well as the clinical blood irradiation purposes. The results of comparison studies were promising which lead to decide permanent migration of all cesium irradiators to X-ray irradiators.
In January 2018 Mount Sinai successfully disposed all of the cesium irradiators. At this time, Mount Sinai, as one of the largest Health care institutions in New York with over 40,000 employees, has migrated completely to alternative technology and removed the risk permanently. For the last one and half years, the new research x-ray irradiators have been working smoothly without any issue with the researchers. In addition, the blood bank has been using x-ray irradiators without any problem in the last two and half years. The patient care has not been affected at all and risks of dirty bomb have been removed.
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WAM-C.3
09:15 Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment/Stakeholder Preparedness Review (THIRA/SPR) for Technical Audiences MF Howe*, FEMA/DHS
; H Hollingsworth, FEMA/DHS; B Yoo, FEMA/DHS
Abstract: The biennial Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment/Stakeholder Preparedness Review (THIRA/SPR) is prepared by State, Territorial, Tribal, and major urban area governments to prioritize assets, identify gaps, and request resources (grants) to address identified threats and hazards. Science and technology focused individuals, departments, and organizations are often not aware that the THIRA/SPR process exists and are not tapped for their knowledge and expertise. This presentation targets a technical audience to introduce them to THIRA/SPR with the intent that they will seek State, Territorial, Urban, and Tribal points of contact, contribute to hazard identification, and provide potential means to mitigate hazards and threats.
Intended outcomes of the session include an understanding of the process and the benefit of the THIRA/SPR process, potential shortcomings in the area of technical hazards, and THIRA/SPR as an avenue to obtain grant funding to mitigate technical hazards and threats with justification.
This proposal was developed based on discussions with technical audiences at the Health Physics Society (HPS) annual meeting. The professionals at the HPS meeting indicated that the technical and scientific community is aware of technical hazards and is very interested (often involved) in mitigating these hazards. However, these science and technology focused individuals had no knowledge of THIRA/SPR and its role in securing grants and quantifying preparedness at a state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal level.
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WAM-C.4
09:30 Benchmarking Utility for Performance Evaluations of Radionuclide Identification Algorithms AJ Morton*, University of New Mexico
; AA Hecht, University of New Mexico; M Monterial, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; KE Nelson, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; SE Labov, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Abstract: Radionuclide identification through gamma-ray spectroscopy faces numerous challenges: intervening materials, source masking, and noise from natural background radiation all degrade counting statistics and pose significant hindrances to nuclear threat identification. These and other challenges, such as calibration drift, often result in radionuclide identification systems mischaracterizing the presence of, or completely failing to detect, potential dangers. Current and future research aims to improve the software used to analyze the collected spectra. However, evaluating such software is a complicated task, especially when comparing multiple algorithms to each other. It follows that a means for fairly evaluating the performance of algorithms, tailored specifically for radionuclide identification, would be beneficial to the radiological and nuclear detection community. An evaluation tool with clearly defined benchmarks would facilitate improvements in the accuracy and confidence of algorithms during research and development, as well as assist end-users when evaluating commercial systems for acquisition. The University of New Mexico, in collaboration with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, presents the initial development of open-source software for accomplishing such performance evaluations. The Benchmarking Algorithm for RadioNuclide Identification (BARNI) utility contains a basic, internal peak-finding algorithm, against which other systems can be compared using commonly used metrics, such as the F-score. This presentation provides an overview of the BARNI software, as well as benchmarks that resulted from evaluation of both real and simulated spectral data. Examples of importing the results from other systems for evaluation against the benchmarks are also provided. Finally, plans for further development of the BARNI software tool are discussed.
(Prepared by LLNL under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.)
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WAM-C.5
09:45 The ROSS Position Task Book, FEMA 509 Typing and OneResponder WE Irwin*, Vermont Department of Health
Abstract: The development of the Radiological Operations Support Specialist (ROSS) included testing ROSS in exercises, a job task analysis to develop training, and training of nearly 100 ROSS candidates to date. Recently, a FEMA 509 describing the education, experience, training and other requirements of Type 3, 2 and 1 ROSS was completed and Position Task Books for each were approved by the National Integration Center. This session will describe what it takes to be a Type 3 ROSS, the entry level position, through the Type 1 ROSS who can serve any level of response for any radiological or nuclear emergency response and recovery using FEMA's OneResponder tool. OneResponder was built by the RadResponder and ChemResponder people and makes completing and document required tasks for the ROSS competencies highly efficient. The ROSS is the first radiological and nuclear emergency preparedness position to be incorporated into OneResponder.
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WAM-C.6
10:30 Can the Roadmap for ROSS Ready Use a Higher Education Expressway? KA Higley*, Oregon State University
Abstract: Radiological Operations Support Specialists (ROSS) are volunteers with specific training that can support operations during an emergency. They are state and local assets who serve as technical specialists to emergency command staff. ROSS are categorized by type (1 through 3) which reflects their specific capabilities as recognized through the National Incident Management (NIMS) System. The higher ROSS designation requires undergraduate or graduate degrees in health physics or related fields in addition to specialized training and certification. Within the Health Physics Society multiple calls have been made to increase the number of ROSS qualified individuals. By actively working with academic health physics (or related) programs it is possible to build an efficient pipeline for more ROSS. Higher education has a vested interest in providing their graduates with marketable skills and certifications, as they need to demonstrate successful career paths for graduates. ROSS capability aligns with these goals. ROSS, or ROSS-ready credentialing will necessitate academic programs work in tandem with Federal agencies and other organizations such as HPS and ABHP to agree to the pipeline template. One possible example is the Engineer in Training process. A designation of "ROSS Ready" would also require that a set of knowledge, skills, and abilities be approved by academic programs for inclusion in their curriculum. ROSS Ready designation, whether attained through an academic degree, credential, certificate, or badge could provide a boost to both students and academic programs (which need sufficient numbers of students to maintain program viability). A well designed pipeline could streamline the ROSS training, and potentially create a system where individual schools can customize programs that provide building blocks, up and to and including ROSS type 3.
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WAM-C.7
10:45 Emerging Radiation Detection Calibration Requirements in Homeland Security Applications JA Chapman*, ORNL
Abstract: Implementing and managing an efficient and effective radiation detection program for either interdicting the illicit trafficking of radioactive material or for responding to radiological incidents, is no easy measure, particularly in an urban setting, far from the availability of calibration standards or trained metrology technologists. For calibration of hand-held health physics instruments, most calibration laboratories have implemented a process consistent with ANSI N323A-1997, and for environmental (low-background) measurements, ANSI N323B. Performance requirements for the specific instruments of use are provided in the ANSI N42.x set of standards. Current standards for detector calibration, daily source checking, and quality control, written specifically for radiological operations do not address completely ambient operating conditions encountered in homeland security applications or consequence management. Specific calibration issues based on lessons-learned incidents will be described as well as limitations of the existing standards for assuring that instruments used for interdiction or response are calibrated as fit for purpose. Opportunities for relaxing some of the traditional requirements should be explored, on a graded-approach, as we move from analog to digital instruments.
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WAM-C.8
11:00 Routine Alarm Performance Testing And Quantitative Multi Energy Calibration Of A Spectroscopic Radiation Pager Using Test Adapters Containing Less Than 10 nCi Of Natural Radioactivity MA Iwatschenko-Borho*, Thermo Fisher Scientific Messtechnik GmbH
Abstract: Following good practice, portable radiation detectors should be checked frequently (prior usage or on a daily basis). Typically small radiation sources containing an exempt quantity of man-made radioactive isotopes in the order of a few µCi are used for this purpose. These routine checks are essentially just qualitative, yielding roughly the expected response reading. The good function of alarm audible, visible and tactile signalization is verified as well. On the other hand the possible risk of damage, contamination or loss of these routine radiation check sources needs to be addressed. Furthermore some users may not feel comfortable facing the unavoidable radiation exposure during the performance check. Real quantitative calibration and accuracy measurements are typically performed much less frequently and require significant infrastructure, such as a dedicated calibrator that typically can only be found in calibration labs. These regular instrument calibrations therefore represent a significant part of the cost of ownership and may well exceed the expenses for batteries and eventual repairs. Considering the extremely demanding sensitivity and stability requirements according to ANSI 42.48 for spectroscopic radiation pagers, a fresh approach to the qualitative and quantitative quality assurance has been developed and can be used in conjunction with the new series of RadEye SPRD radiation pagers. This concept proposes the wide-spread deployment of low activity test adapters containing a primordial isotope Lu-176. Due to the very high gamma sensitivity of the RadEye SPRD, about 7 g of high density lutetium-oxide ceramics, corresponding to less than 10 nCi of Lu-176 are sufficient to trigger an instantaneous radiation alarm once the instrument is brought into contact. The exposure dose rate drops below a fraction of a microrem per h within a few centimeters. Due to the long half-life of 37 billion years, no radioactive decay needs to be taken into account and the weight and activity tolerances are less than 5 %, making the response to different individual test adapters perfectly comparable. The 3 main energy lines of Lutetium are 55 keV, 205 keV and 307 keV. A sum peak extends the covered energy range up to 510 keV. The presentation compares these properties with those of alternative natural and man-made radionuclides.
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WAM-C.9
11:15 Testing of Transuranic Activity Estimation in the iSolo® Radon Rejection Algorithm SJ Cope*, North Carolina State University
; RB Hayes, North Carolina State University
Abstract: Accurate transuranic (TRU) activity estimation in air monitoring must successfully discriminate a varying background signal of short-lived NORM, namely radon (222Rn), thoron (220Rn) and their respective progeny. Radon rejection algorithms claim rapid (i.e., 10s of minutes) TRU activity estimation through spectral curve fitting to characteristic alpha emission peaks. Through the convolved curve fit, the NORM (i.e., background noise) signal for background subtractions can be estimated in the TRU activity region-of-interest. 35 studies of triplicate air samples in varied time of day and duration will collect NORM interferents for testing. Each experiment was designed to have the 3 air filters collecting over identical durations within a few feet of each other for similar NORM progeny collection. One filter will be counted with NORM progeny such that one would expect a zero TRU signal. The other 2 filters will be counted with surrogate spikes of TRU activity via check sources placed underneath the filter with a central hole-punch for discrimination of the NORM from the TRU. 239Pu and 230Th check sources will test both pure alpha and mixed alpha/beta TRU activity discrimination of particular concern in radiological releases. Characterization of the surrogate spikes without radon progeny interferents will allow for a control group to compare estimated TRU activity values against known contributions. The region of alpha/beta overlap at a threshold energy discriminator is of interest for characterizing the crosstalk between the alpha and beta regions. Spectroscopy methods, with uncertainty characterization, will be compared against gross alpha/beta counting methods previously developed. The short-lived radon progeny interferents decay and can assist in TRU activity determination. When using these technologies for radiological emergency response decision-making, quality assay results are paramount prior to accepting TRU estimates from any radon rejection algorithms.
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WAM-C.10
11:30 Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Natural Disasters EJ Waller*, UOIT
; JF Lafortune, ISR
Abstract: The Fukushima disaster following the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan demonstrates the complexity of responding to nuclear or radiological emergencies during a natural disaster. Current international safety standards and guidance do not specifically address this type of situation. This talk presents the conflicts between the response to the conventional impacts and the radiological consequences, real and perceived, can impede the effectiveness of the overall emergency response. This talk discusses the strategic and operational challenges likely to be encountered in such a complex emergency, and draws conclusions on how countries should better plan for the low probability but high consequence impacts of natural disasters coincident with a nuclear accident at a nuclear power plant.
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