VTU-C - Special Session: Homeland Security and Emergency Response 10:10 - 13:55
NOTE: ALL VIRTUAL SESSIONS WILL TAKE PLACE DURING PACIFIC STANDARD TIME.
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| Chair(s): Gary Chen
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VTU-C.1
10:10 RadResponder Network – A Quick Walkthrough With The Newest Updates G Chen*, U.S. EPA
Abstract: In the past, there were tools that federal agencies used to input and share radiological data. However, the tools were not easy to use, and the output data were not easily shareable across the agencies. Most importantly, they were not available to all of the radiation emergency organizations at all levels (state, tribal and local). It is essential that, during a radiological emergency event, there is a common tool that is easy to use and accessible to all organizations nationwide to share radiological data. Together, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), created the RadResponder Network. The programing development of RadResponder Network began in 2012, and it is aiming to become the national standard and Whole Community solution for the management of radiological data.
Since 2012, the RadResponder Network have grown from 300 registered organizations and 1000 registered users to over 1793 organizations and 10000 users today. RadResponder is an ongoing project, and it constantly improves itself by adding new functions and enhancement from the communities' input and suggestions. The purpose of this presentation is to inform the communities about the technical enhancement and new functions that have been added to the RadResponder Network since the 2019 Annual HPS meeting.
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VTU-C.2
10:25 New and Emerging Capabilities in RadResponder: Radiological Simulation, Real-Time Modeling Integration, and Customizable Data Assessment Policies B Palmer*, Chainbridge Technologies
; SM Duling, Chainbridge Technologies; J Chapman, Department of Energy/Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Abstract: Over the past year, three emerging RadResponder capabilities have enhanced its value as a training tool and advanced its interoperability with federal assets. Users will soon be able to deploy simulated deposition models in RadResponder events, using either pre-set templates or customized deposition files from RASCAL or NARAC. With the RadResponder mobile application, field teams can see simulated alpha, beta and gamma readings to support realistic data collection and dose assessment training. Second, the new “IMAAC Portal” lets users request modeling products from the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), which can seamlessly upload products to requestors’ events for display on the event map as GIS layers. IMAAC can archive products as events endure and new models are produced. Finally, new assessment features let organizations build customized, multi-step assessment policies by data type. Agencies can use their unique assessment policies within a common event space. New integrations allow the Federal Radiological Assessment Center (FRMAC) to retrieve and share back event data to provide seamless federal support to state and local responses.
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VTU-C.3
10:40 Making the Radiological Operations Support Specialist a Profession WE Irwin*, Vermont Dept. of Health
Abstract: The Radiological Operations Support Specialist (ROSS) is the first of three planned Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) specialists. Work on the ROSS began in earnest in 2014 with the support of the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration, DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors. Today, there are more than 100 trained ROSS across the United States and classes for more are starting this spring. ROSS work on their FEMA Type 1, 2 and 3 Position Task Books to become the ultimate radiological and nuclear emergency response and recovery subject matter experts. The ROSS Program is now taking steps to transition from a developmental model to a new health physics profession. In this course, we will review the brief history of the ROSS and discuss how ROSS Ready Curricula in colleges and universities, initial and continuing education, tabletop and full-scale exercises, catastrophic incident simulation, and powerful tools provided by federal agencies and the National Labs are being used to build this new and important profession.
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VTU-C.4
10:55 Using the EPA's Protective Action Guidelines to Develop Compensatory Response Plans During a Pandemic AE Leek*, Iowa Department of Public Health
; J Semancik, Connecticut Department of Energy and Environment
Abstract: Protection of the public and workers following a radiological or nuclear emergency have been extensively studied and exercised. Guidance in the form of EPA PAGs has been issued and accepted as the standard basis for these actions. The general guidance provided is based primarily on assessing the risks associated with the radiological factors alone. However, as demonstrated in response to the tsunami and Fukushima nuclear incident in Japan, these events seldom occur in isolation from other risk inducing events.
Today, the COVID-19 represents a significant public health risk that must be considered if a radiological or nuclear event were to occur concurrently. In particular, the high public health risks associated with community transmission and mortality of COVID-19 challenge our most familiar and rehearsed radiological response strategies. Providing emergency actions in the best interest of public health and safety requires adjusting the way we might determine protective action recommendations to best protect both responder and public health and safety. We must consider the overall risk from concurrent threats and take actions that reduce the overall risk.
The EPA PAG manual does allow for these considerations in making protective action decisions, but we have been conditioned by training and exercises to generally only consider the specific guidelines in the tables. The additional guidance provided in the footnotes and bases is often not exercised, and can tend to be overlooked. However, when properly applied, the PAGs provide the necessary flexibility for decision makers to account for additional public health risks, and we can use this guidance to build a more effective response strategy. Given that a COVID-19 vaccine may not be available for months to years, deliberate evaluation of radiological emergency response actions during the pandemic is warranted. The authors have applied the full guidance and flexibility provided in the 2017 EPA PAG Manual to develop more specific guidance for making protective action decisions in the best interest of reducing overall risk and maximizing public health and safety.
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VTU-C.5
11:10 The CBRNE Medical Operations Science Support Expert (CMOSSE) CN Coleman*, ASPR/DHHS
; JF Koerner, ASPR; JL Bader, ASPR; C Hrdina, ASPR; W Farmer, ASPR; KD Cliffer; C Norman Coleman
Abstract: For effective, timely and up-to-date preparedness, planning, and response, a need for subject-matter expertise in the individual “threats” is well recognized. This includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats. Experience from the Office of the Assistant Secretary and Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department of Health and Human Services, including work with state and local emergency planners and academicians, has demonstrated the need for overarching expertise in CBRNE operations, defined as the CBRNE Medical Operations Science Support Expert (CMOSSE). The CMOSSE (1) understands that CBRNE incidents require an integrated systems approach involving core elements: (a) basic and clinical sciences, (b) modeling and systems management, (c) planning, (d) response and incident management, (e) recovery and resilience, (f) lessons learned, and (g) continuous improvement; (2) understands the key functions and contributions of CBRNE science practitioners; (3) helps direct strategic and tactical CBRNE planning and responses through first-hand experience; (4) provides advice to senior decision-makers managing response activities; and (5) works within the incident command system (ICS). We propose that the CMOSSE encompasses a distinct competency and is an integral member of the senior managers planning for and responding to CBRNE incidents. This concept has been developed by a broad group of experts and outlined in a publication (Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 13:995-1110, 2019). Given the complexity, size, public perception, and likelihood of a “no notice” incident, the radiological/nuclear space provides an opportunity to further detail the competencies of a CMOSSE and integrate it broadly with state, local, territorial, and tribal emergency planners and with regional and global partners. This is proposed to be a partnership among government, academia, professional societies, and the private sector. It meshes well with the Radiological Operations Support Specialist (ROSS), a radiological and nuclear subject-matter expert trained to work effectively within the ICS.
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VTU-C.6
11:25 Working with Local Law Enforcement & First Responders WA Lorenzen*, Boston Children's Hospital
Abstract: The creation of a systematic and well understood program for various agencies with radiological/nuclear detection capabilities to interdict, identify, and respond to events that may indicate illicate radiological/nuclear material out of regulatory control is essential. Supporting core program objectives that cross numerous agencies can be established to coordinate an approach to identify radiological/nuclear materials and provide consistent operational procedures and
practices to ensure radiological/nuclear materials intended for malevolent purposes are mitigated. SME's from the private sector can assist in creating and communicating the appropriate response protocols and procedures for the reporting and escalation of radiological/nuclear material that are identified by various agencies having potential
jurisdictional boundaries through cooperative partnerships. Program development and partnership with the private sector that possesses such materials as well as the engagement of private sector subject matter experts can be leveraged to enhance overall response, mitigation, and safety of
the program.
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VTU-C.7
11:40 The Veterans Health Administration Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team and Office of Emergency Management Disaster Response Operations JS Bravenec*, Veterans Health Administration
Abstract: The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) operates the largest integrated healthcare system in the United States. The VHA’s contingency mission is to ensure continuity of hospital and medical services to Veterans, military personnel, first responders, and the public, as appropriate. The VHA Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team (MERRT) is comprised of VHA physicians, health physicists, and emergency managers who train and are available for deployment to augment institutional health care providers in response to an incident involving nuclear or radiological materials. MERRT’s mission is to assess the radiological impact on health and provide medical consultation and services on the treatment of individuals exposed to ionizing radiation or contaminated by radioactive materials. The MERRT is listed as a response asset in the Nuclear Radiological Incident Annex of the National Response Framework and coordinates closely with its partner radiation response assets during operations. MERRT operates under the VHA Office of Emergency Management which provides expertise and leadership for the VHA enterprise through the integration of multiple emergency management programs, assets, functions, and supporting activities to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond and recover from disaster situations.
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11:55 BREAK
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VTU-C.8
12:25 The 3rd edition of the Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, updates to Chapter 4: Early Medical Care WG Farmer*, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
; JL Bader, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; CN Coleman, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; CM Hrdina, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; JF Koerner, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
Abstract: The Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation (PGfRND) has been an important tool for Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial planners to identify needs and create contingency plans to respond to a nuclear detonation. The most recent edition of the planning guidance was published in 2010. Over the past decade, there have been substantial advancements in science, countermeasure development, planning, and policy development that inform many of the critical updates to the new edition of the PGfRND. In the third edition, publishing in 2021, we include these critical advancements in the field to update the planning guidance for emergency responders, planners, policy developers, and other officials who rely on this tool to guide their efforts. Some highlights include findings from the scarce resources project, advancements in medical countermeasure developments, updating treatment options for expected injury types, new concepts in mass-casualty triage, and expanding on the radiation triage-treatment-transport (RTR) response model. These critical updates and their importance and application for planners will be discussed.
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VTU-C.9
12:40 Minimum Resolution Requirements for Gamma Identification Algorithms AM Ash*, Texas A&M University, College Station
; CM Marianno, Texas A&M University, College Station
Abstract: Each year there are millions of dollars spent on the research and production of high-resolution detectors. This research indicates that the pursuit of higher resolution detectors is not always necessary. GADRAS, Genie, and GammaVision identification routines were employed to analyze simulated NaI spectra of highly enriched uranium under various conditions as detector resolution was increased. The purpose was to determine at what detector resolution (termed the terminal resolution) where they could no longer recognize 235U. GADRAS identified isotopes using template matching while Genie and GammaVision utilized mathematical routines for a peak search/identification algorithm. GADRAS, Genie, and GammaVision were evaluated using six source configurations: bare HEU, 50% shielded HEU, 90% shielded HEU, bare HEU with an interference source of 99mTc, bare HEU with 99mTc both shielded 50%, and bare HEU with 99mTc both shielded 90%. Using GADRAS, the terminal resolution for each source configuration was 100%, 64%, 49%, 26%, 30%, and 25%, respectively. Using Genie, the terminal resolution for each source configuration was 22%, 24%, 24%, 5%, 9%, and 10%, respectively. GammaVision did not utilize a user-defined confidence level to its isotope identification so it always tried to assign “peaks” from its isotope library even at 100% resolution. In conclusion, GammaVision was not an appropriate software for use in this research. GADRAS was determined to be the most successful software for isotope identification for suboptimal detector resolutions. Furthermore, is possible to use suboptimal detector resolutions to effectively identify HEU even in spectra with interfering photopeaks at higher resolutions.
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VTU-C.10
12:55 Implementation of the Orphan Source Search and Secure Program in the Time of COVID-19 Y Casatenda, PNNL
; RA Kahn*, ANL; R Machado, Mirion; B McRee, PNNL; J Rolando, SLI; T Taplin, DOE/NNSA
Abstract: The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security (ORS) Search & Secure (S&S) Program has been a leader in providing support for the detection, identification, recovery and safe storage of orphan and vulnerable radioactive sources and materials. The S&S program offers several training workshops (Basic and Advanced), provides assistance with orphan source searches, and has develops sustainability approaches to assure longevity of the program in partner countries. The latter task is accomplished, in part, by utilization of the Realistic Adaptive Interactive Learning System (RAILS) as a real-time training and search simulation program. Due to travel restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the S&S team developed remote versions of all its training and assistance programs. These remote programs utilize the ZoomGov platform and RAILS, providing the ability to conduct radiation detection instrumentation training, as well as comprehensive virtual orphan source searches. ZoomGov has also been used for online meetings with partner countries to address sustainability strategies and equipment review and repair. These activities were implemented in 2020 in support of multiple partner countries. Online training development and conduct, challenges and lessons during these S&S activities will be discussed during this presentation.
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VTU-C.11
13:10 Estimation of Protection Factors for the Transport of Radioactive Material S Dalak*, Texas A&M University
; S Dewji, Texas A&M University
Abstract: In the event of radiological incident involving the release of radioactive material, it may be crucial to estimate doses to individuals who are transported through contaminated areas by vehicles. To this extent, Radiation Protection Factor (RPF) for vehicles can be obtained for different types of vehicle, which indicates the protection level of the vehicle from external radiation sources. Prior studies evaluating RPFs demonstrate a lack of realistic vehicle configurations and the results cannot be extended directly to scenarios when a vehicle is surrounded by a contaminated environmental field. An analysis of the RPF values for vehicles in contaminated environment could increase the utility of RPF values and improve the radiation protection protocol and consequence management scenarios. In this work, sex-averaged effective dose rate coefficients were computed employing International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 103 recommendations for monoenergetic photon sources distributed in soil, air, and inside of a truck-trailer for male and female mathematical phantoms within and exterior to the vehicle. The Monte Carlo transport code and the Phantom With Moving Arms and Legs were used to determine effective dose rate coefficients for phantoms in driving position. The resulting coefficients were used to estimate RPFs of vehicle in several contaminated environments to tabulate the RPFs for each radionuclide using a radionuclide interpolator which utilizes the ICRP Publication 107 Nuclear Decay Database.
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VTU-C.12
13:25 Dosimetry Assessment of Reference Populations Exposed to Prompt Radiation Fields from Nuclear Weapons A Rosenstrom*, Texas A&M University
; E Asano, Texas A&M University; D Hooper, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; K Griffin, National Cancer Institute; C Lee, National Cancer Institute; S Dewji, Texas A&M University
Abstract: In the event of a fission-based weapon detonation, dose coefficients can be harnessed to provide dose assessments for defense, emergency preparedness, and consequence management to support defense and homeland security stakeholders and decision-makers. Dose coefficients for these weapons have been previously calculated for epidemiological purposes specific to the 1945 Japanese cohort of atomic bomb survivors reported by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation. Dose assessment using the latest models in radiation protection have not yet been harnessed to provide an estimated for a more representative reference population. We employed a series of computational human phantoms representing international reference individuals developed by the University of Florida and the National Cancer Institute; the voxel phantom series contains newborn, 1-, 5-, 10-, 15-, and 35-year-old males and females. Irradiation of the phantoms was simulated using MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle) transport code version 6.2 to determine organ dose coefficients under four idealized irradiation geometries from the free-in-air bomb neutron and photon fluence spectra at three distances from the detonation hypocenter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Through these simulations, age-specific dose coefficients were determined for individual organs. Various articulated stylized phantoms were simulated to estimate the effect of body positioning on dose coefficients for improved dose estimation and reconstruction. Results additionally demonstrate that 137Cs and the Watt fission spectrum (which may be considered for experimental testing of medical countermeasures and other dose/dose rate reproduction activities) are not effective general surrogate sources for fission weapons. The dose coefficient values produced can be implemented in nuclear emergency response and defense codes for higher fidelity estimation of radiation detriment to a reference population.
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VTU-C.13
13:40 The Importance of Communication and Its Potential Impact on Public Perception and Understanding of Radiation-related Issues SL Sugarman*, SummitET (Summit Exercises and Training)
Abstract: As health physicists, we play a key role in providing information and guidance to various stakeholders to help facilitate good decision-making. Words have meaning, and subtle shifts in the language we use can have a large impact on the message that’s being delivered and the perceptions of the receiving audience. The implications of effective communications are far reaching – whether it is helping an individual who has radiation-related concerns about an anticipated medical procedure or affecting the public’s willingness to accept emergency management recommendations during an incident involving radioactive materials. We should all hone our communication skills in order to help educate others about what radiation can and cannot do in an manner that is easily understood by the recipient. A recent example of an overreaction based on a lack of understanding of the relative hazard happened on January 8, 2021 in Haddon Township, New Jersey. Haddon Township High School was evacuated over radiation concerns when a student brought a uranium-glazed plate (Fiestaware) to school. The student had been given a Geiger counter for Christmas and he brought the instrument and plate to school to show it to a teacher. Agencies that responded to the scene included local law enforcement, fire, HAZMAT, and even representatives from the county prosecutor’s office. Unnecessary responses of this nature draw resources from areas where they may be needed, are expensive, negatively impact the involved institutions, create concern/fear for the public, unintentionally increase risk to evacuees – not to mention the overall risk associated with just responding to an incident. Health physicists work with something that not a lot of people understand – radiation. Radiation can be a scary word. A lack of knowledge and/or not understanding how radiation works can lead people to make decisions they may not have otherwise made had they a better understanding of the true nature of the potential hazard.
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