WAM-B - Special Session: The Contamination of the Harborview Research and Training Building, Seattle, Washington North 222ABC 08:00 - 11:50
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WAM-B.1
08:00 Response to Inadvertent Contamination of the Harborview Research and Training Building, Seattle, Washington JL Bliss*, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract: On May 2, 2019, during removal of an approximately 103 TBq (2,800 Ci) cesium-137 sealed source from the Harborview Research and Training Building (HRT) in Seattle, Washington, the source was breached and a small portion of the activity was released. This event initiated an almost two-year effort to return the HRT building of the University of Washington to beneficial use. While cost was not an overriding issue, speed was a high priority in order to return this important medical research facility to beneficial use. Following a brief introduction to the event and the initial response, the remainder of this session will present the challenges faced and the techniques used to ensure a result consisted with regulatory guidelines and ALARA. Several non-aligned regulatory agencies and frequently modified stakeholder needs required frequent changes to ongoing activities. Finally, the decisions made and an assessment of what worked well and what could have been done differently will be presented. (LA-UR-21-22357)
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WAM-B.2
08:20 Harborview Research and Training Building Initial LANL Response R Rasmussen*, LANL
; M Fanning, LANL; G George, LANL
Abstract: On May 2, 2019 there was a Cs-137 release in a research and training building in downtown Seattle, WA. Twelve days after the Cs-137 release, three Los Alamos National Laboratory Certified Health Physicists along with one Laboratory Senior Manager arrived to assist in the response. The CHPs were tasked to be technical intermediaries between response personnel and the University of Washington. This paper will discuss the actions taken during the initial response to include determining the extent of and minimizing the spread of contamination while addressing competing priorities such as the potential failure of freezers containing biological hazards due to the building ventilation being secured.
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WAM-B.3
08:35 Integration of the the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) assets to the Harborview Breached Source Incident SC Hoover*, Los Alamos National Laboratory
; MR Fishburn, Hanford Mission Integration Solutions
Abstract: When the Cs-137 source was breached and the elevated contamination discovered on the evening of 2
May 2019, first responders in the greater Seattle area provided the initial response. Once the extent of
the problem became apparent on 3 May 2019, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear
Emergency Support Team (NEST) personnel were requested to respond, to attempt to begin
characterization of the extent of the radioactive material release. Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP), Region 8 personnel arrived the evening of 3 May 2019 from their home location in Southeastern
Washington, and began their activities. This paper will discuss the initial actions of RAP-8 personnel
which included contamination and ventilation assessments, their support of environmental
measurements immediately outside the facility, and systems unique to the building that served to
concentrate the materials released. The eventual implementation of a formal Incident Management
Team (IMT) by the NEST program, will be discussed, as will the scope of both the immediate and the
longer-term support to the response provided by a number of NNSA NEST assets. The integration of
NEST assets into the overall incident response remained an integral component of the response through
the conclusion of Phase 2 operations.
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WAM-B.4
08:50 Initial Characterization and Planning for Recovery of the Harborview Research and Training Building (HRT) Following the Cesium-137 Contamination Event JL Bliss*, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract: Even while follow on responders to the cesium-137 release, such as DOE Radiological Assistance Program teams, were working to ensure the safety of the surrounding neighborhood was maintained, work began to recover the HRT. During this Phase 1 work International Isotopes, Inc. (INIS) and Chase Environmental Group, Inc. (CEG) performed initial characterization of contamination and concurrently implemented contamination control and reduction measures culminating in a Phase 1 final status survey (FSS) and Phase 1 final status survey report (FSSR) submitted to, and accepted by, the Washington Department of Health (WDOH). Planning and preparation for Phase 2 of the recovery began. Phase 2 included recovery and shipment of the cesium source and associated tooling that remained in the sealed room where the release occurred. Safely and compliantly performing this work required additional licenses and permits. Phase 1 concluded with an understanding of the extent of contamination within the HRT and an approved plan for recovery and shipping of the source and equipment remaining in the HRT Building. (LA-UR-21-22352)
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WAM-B.5
09:10 Harborview Research and Training Building, Recovery Phases 2Ai, 2B and 2Aii: Reentry in to Ground Zero and Source Removal. M Fanning*, LANL
; G George, LANL; R Rasmussen, LANL; G Schramm, LANL; J Bliss, LANL; S Hoover, LANL; B Rees, LANL; R Pierson, PNNL
Abstract: Following immediate actions taken to secure the Cs-137 contamination event, the loading dock
where Cs-137 source breach occurred was closed and sealed. The loading dock, room 220, is
approximately 30’ x 30’ with access to the outside via a personnel door and a roll up door. There is a double personnel door connecting the HR&T building corridor to room 220. There are 4 rooms adjacent to room 220. Room 220 still contained the 2000 Ci Cs-137 source and the mobile hot cell (MHC) used to unload the source from the device and transfer to a temporary storage shield. Re-entry required coordination between the Harborview Medical Center, Washington Department of Health (WDOH), University of Washington (UW), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), RAP region 8, and the contractor. In addition to identifying the appropriate radiological controls, permits and licenses were required to be obtained prior to
beginning operations. Engineering controls established for entry included portable negative air machines, HEPA filtration, and a three-room contamination control point tent.
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09:50 BREAK
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WAM-B.6
10:20 Radiological Clearance of a Biomedical Research Facility (Cleanup Goals, ALARA, & Remediation) RM Pierson*, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
; JL Bliss, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract: On May 2, 2019, a sealed radioactive source containing ~2,800 curies of cesium-137 (137Cs) was breached at the Harborview Research and Training (HRT) Building in downtown Seattle while attempting to recover the source for disposal. Safe recovery of this significant source term followed by radiological characterization, establishment of cleanup goals, and remediation activities to support a free release for unrestricted use was very challenging. The radiological impact on the facility from the source breach was initially underestimated and later determined to be much broader with representative contamination spread to the exhaust ventilation system, northeastern portion of eight building floors, and a minor release to the environment. Remediation was completed in December of 2020 with successful regulatory release in April 2021.
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WAM-B.7
10:50 Assessment of Contamination within the Harborview Research and Training Building (HRT) Exhaust Ventilation Systems JL Bliss*, Los Alamos National Laboratory
; JM Pierson, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Abstract: It was known at the conclusion of the final status survey (FSS) for large parts of the HRT building during Phase 1 of the response, that the exhaust ventilation systems within the HRT were impacted by the cesium-137 release that occurred on May 2, 21019. While the HRT was designed to safely work with hazardous materials and the ventilation system did not recycle exhaust air, configuration of the various ventilation systems following the release allowed contamination to enter portions of the exhaust systems. Obtaining suitable access to the internal surfaces of these systems for adequate direct measurement of contamination would greatly delay restoration of the building to beneficial use, as it would require significant reconstruction. Achieving a full understanding of the complex ventilation systems servicing a complex biomedical research building was an important precursor to effective evaluation. Discussion will provide an overview of the numerous exhaust ventilation systems and the current understanding of how these systems contributed to the movement of contamination within the building. Identification of non-destructive measurement techniques that allowed rapid survey and release of the ventilation system saving considerable project time are also discussed. (LA-UR-21-22345)
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WAM-B.8
11:10 Contribution of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Radiation Protection Services Group to the Harbor View Research and Training Building (HRT) Remediation and Release Effort JR Bland, Los Alamos National Lab
; JJ Douglas, Los Alamos National Lab; LL Fresquez, Los Alamos National Lab; R Lopez, Los Alamos National Lab; M Jaramillo, Los Alamos National Lab; AL Justus, Los Alamos National Lab; TD McLean*, Los Alamos National Lab; RE Montoya, Los Alamos National Lab; RJ Purdy, Los Alamos National Lab; CE Quintana, CD Roybal, DT Seagraves, CT Simpson, JJ Trujillo , Los Alamos National Lab
Abstract: The Radiation Protection Services (RP-SVS) group at Los Alamos National Laboratory is responsible for the procurement, acceptance testing, maintenance, repair and calibration of all the radiological protection instrumentation at the Lab (~10000 instruments both fixed and portable). Throughout the remediation and release effort at HRT, the RP-SVS group supported the campaign by supplying instruments including, air monitors, sample counters, dual scintillator probes and 2”x2” NaI probes. As will be discussed, the NaI-based instruments were set up to preferentially detect the 662 keV full energy peak and fitted with high-Z collimators to limit the field of view of the detectors.
To aid in the interpretation of the NaI count rate measurements, MCNP6® calculations were performed by the RP-SVS group for several 137Cs contamination scenarios. Most of these Monte Carlo simulations involved modeling round and rectangular duct work of various dimensions that comprised HRT’s ventilation system but calculations were also made for exterior brick work, cast iron pipes and an O2 filter assembly. The MCNP6® results provided the NaI instrument response data (cpm per pCi/cm2) required to make estimates of contamination levels based on net photopeak count rates. The presentation will discuss the MCNP6® calculations and results including the methods used to expedite the preparation of the input files and parsing of the output files.
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