WPM-B - Special Session: The Contamination of the Harborview Research and Training Building, Seattle, Washington Part 2 North 222ABC 14:30 - 16:55
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WPM-B.1
14:30 Harborview Research and Training Building Ventilation System Hold Up Measurements: Spectral Nondestructive Assay Platform (SNAP) M Fanning*, LANL
; J Bliss, LANL; S Hoover, LANL; B Rees, LANL; K Stults, LANL; S Myers, LANL; R Pierson, PNNL
Abstract: In an effort to preserve as much of the ventilation system of the Harborview Research & Training (HR&T) building, multiple nondestructive assay hold-up measurement methodologies
were considered. In addition to modeling various ventilation system ducts and components, two commercial, off the shelf systems were reviewed. Although the primary method of analysis was MCNP, SNAP, by Pajarito Scientific, was chosen as a secondary method. SNAP’s original program design intent was a waste assay program for standard waste boxes and 55-gallon drums. The program’s limited modeling capability was adapted to for ventilation hold-up measurements. The team used SNAP to roughly model rectangular or cylindrical ducts, duct elbows, and dampers to estimate the activity per 100cm2 within the detectors field of view.
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WPM-B.2
14:45 Harborview Research and Training Building (HRT) MARSSIM, FSS, and FSS Report Overview DC DiCello*, LANL/Radiation Safety & Control Services (RSCS)
; M Cushman, PermaFix Environmental Services; A Lopez, PermaFix Environmental Services; JL Bliss, LANL; RM Pierson, PNNL; M Fanning, LANL
Abstract: MARSSIM FSS methodology was applied to impacted areas of the HRT. One hundred and sixty-five (165) Survey Units (SU) had Final Status Surveys performed based on a Survey Instruction Packages (SIPs) for each of the SUs. FSS data went through Supervisor and quality control reviews and digitization including pictures of each survey point. FSSs included systematic, judgmental, and QC measurements. The FSS data for a SU was rolled up into a Data Summary that included measurements of total and removable activity in dpm/100cm2 and incorporated the use of data logging to record floor scan and handheld scan data with statistical analysis of the data. The SU Data Summaries were used as the backbone for the FSS Report (FSSR) and the report was organized into chapters by building elevation with unique chapters for ventilation systems and impacted areas external to the building. Various appendices were included with each chapter and included the SIPs, Data Summaries, FSSs, Post FSS Retrospective Analysis, and support surveys for the SUs in the chapter.
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WPM-B.3
15:45 Stakeholder Engagement at Harborview Critical for Project Success MA Smith, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
; RM Pierson*, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; DC DiCello, Radiation Safety & Control Services, Inc.; JL Bliss, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract: For decontamination and decommissioning projects, meeting regulatory requirements is often considered to be the benchmark of success in receiving an approval for unrestricted release. And why not? The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has clearly established criteria for when a site will be considered acceptable for unrestricted use. Simply stated, the residual radioactivity that is distinguishable from background radiation does not result in a maximum dose to an individual exceeding 25 mrem per year and is also ALARA. Further, the process for achieving these goals is well documented in the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). Oh, if it were only that easy! Projects typically have numerous stakeholders that each have an interest in a successful outcome and in this regard Harborview was no exception. Meeting the needs of stakeholders, along with the requirements of the regulatory authority, can be critical to the success of a project. Several examples of stakeholder engagement are highlighted. Each of these stakeholders were engaged in hazardous activities of their own at Harborview and had a firm understanding of the risks associated with that work. However, each also had concerns about continuing that work in the above-background but below-regulatory-criteria radiation environment. It is not unnatural to be cautious when facing a potentially dangerous situation with limited understanding of the hazard, just as you or I may approach high voltage or a biohazard with caution. Engaging these stakeholders as partners to understand each other’s concerns was not only valuable, but necessary. Example stakeholder engagements and lessons learned are described for: (1) maintenance and use of an oxygen supply tank farm, (2) inspection and maintenance of a high-voltage substation vault, and (3) inspection and maintenance of elevators and shafts.
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WPM-B.4
16:00 University of Washington Harborview Research and Training Building Environmental Sample Plan for Cs-137 in Soils and Sediments CA Bullock*, LANL
; JJ Whicker, LANL; MJ Chastenet, LANL
Abstract: The objective of this sampling plan was to confirm, within the stated statistical confidence limits, that the mean level of potential radioactive residual contamination in the soils surrounding the Harborview Research and Training Building is
documented, in appropriate units, and is below the 25 mrem yr-1 (0.25 mSv yr-1) dose limit for public residential exposure.
The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) provides detailed guidance on how to demonstrate that a site is in compliance with a radiation dose- or risk-based regulation. MARSSIM focuses on the demonstration of compliance during the final status survey
following scoping, characterization and any necessary remedial actions.
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WPM-B.5
16:15 Putting the Pieces Together: What Was Learned During Restoration of the Harborview Research and Training Building JL Bliss*, Los Alamos National Laboratory
; RM Pierson, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Abstract: The unexpected contamination event that occurred on May 2, 2019 within the Harborview Research and Training Building is unprecedented. All aspects of the event from the nature of the release, to the radiation hazard presented to a population of workers with varying educational levels and risk perceptions about radiation, and to its location in a downtown area of a large urban area introduced complexities. These factors heightened many concerns that are all too familiar to health physicists. In addition, the many regulatory and stakeholder relationships threatened to reduce confidence in the recovery process. Implementation of the Incident Command System and adoption of a Unified Command structure provided the organization and focus to restore steak holder conviction that the project would succeed. Implications for future responses to accidental or purposeful dispersion of radioactivity in urban areas will be identified and recommendations for future responses will be proposed. Success during this response is due to fundamentally strong decision making through leadership, adoption of a Unified Command (UC) structure, transparency, and finally, technical competence. (LA-UR-21-22353)
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