MAM-D - Special Session: Homeland Security Part 1 Woodrow Wilson D 09:30 - 12:10
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| Chair(s): William Irwin, Jeff Chapman
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MAM-D.1
09:30 An analysis of the GSR Part 7 EPR Requirements against the real-world experience of the response to the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 L Bergman*, Health Canada
; E Waller, Ontario Tech U
Abstract: The tragic events that occurred in the United States on September 11 2001 shifted the paradigm for emergency preparedness and response (EPR) for terrorist initiated events. The consequence management component of EPR is similar regardless of location or the nature of the initiating event; therefore, the lessons learned from the response that followed in the day and weeks after the events of September 11 can be used to inform EPR plans and arrangements across nations and industries. A record of these lessons learned can be found in the Arlington County After Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon. In this work, we will compare the findings of this after action report to the requirements in the current standard for nuclear EPR, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Safety Requirements (GSR) Part 7: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. This comparison against observed lessons learned from the consequence management of a significant emergency response allows us to better understand the basis for the GSR Part 7 Requirements, validate them using real emergency response experience and identify any gaps or areas for improvement in the current nuclear EPR framework.
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MAM-D.2
09:50 The Radiological Operations Support Specialist as a Profession WE Irwin*, Vermont Department of Health
; Wi Irwin
Abstract: There are now more than 250 men and women across the United States who have taken the first step to become a Radiological Operations Support Specialist (ROSS). After taking the Counterterrorism Operations Support (CTOS) ROSS course they request a Position Task Book that provides a pathway from Type 4 to Type 1 ROSS. The former can help first responders at the front lines of radiological and nuclear emergency response and recovery while the latter can help any level of government official manage any type of radiological or nuclear disaster.
Initially ROSS were only affiliated with the National Qualification System. Today more than half the States are building ROSS Task Forces using the Urban Search and Rescue model. We are working with the National Labs to build continuing education using the nation's newest and most advanced tools and guidance, and exercising ROSS at nuclear power plants, for dirty bombs, for catastrophic transportation accidents and even a nuclear detonation. We are also developing remote incident support by those with unique skillsets like internal dosimetry, radiological data assessment, disaster medicine, crisis emergency communications, the Department of Defense CBRN Response Enterprise, and hydrogeology.
Ultimately, we will train more than 1,000 people and get 400 or more who will actively work to build a substantial and self-sustaining radiological and nuclear emergency response and recovery workforce that can help any city, county, state, or nation respond better and recover faster. We hope the incidents we prepare for never happen, but if we do not prepare who will? As with many other developments in health physics, we hope the capabilities exemplified in the ROSS Task Forces help similar professions. This why the FEMA CBRN Office is building companion Chemical Operations Support Specialist and Biological Operations Support Specialist programs.
In addition to building these capabilities, this new profession is constantly pushing the boundaries of our science and profession. We engage in fascinating work and conversations, and we meet and create with some of the nation's most interesting people. We hope you might want to join us. This presentation will describe how you can.
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MAM-D.3
10:10 NCRP Statement No. 14 – Instrument Response Verification and Calibration for Use In Radiation Emergencies (2022) WE Irwin*, Vermont Department of Health
; BR Buddemeier, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; GA Klemic, US Department of Homeland Security; LS Pibida, National Institute of Standards and Technology; JA Chapman, US Department of Energy; A Salame-Alfie, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Abstract: This NCRP Statement provides recommendations for maintaining the readiness of radiation detection equipment for use in a large-scale nuclear or radiological emergency. Various instrument inventories are retained by municipal, county, and state entities having different levels of experience and focus, including fire services, law enforcement, emergency management, public health agencies, and hospitals. These instruments can provide valuable and actionable information during an emergency.
The recommendations in this Statement consider not only the objectives of making emergency radiation measurements but also the practical aspects of maintaining equipment that is not used for regulatory compliance and that might be used only rarely. A three-tiered, mission-oriented approach is described, which includes periodic laboratory calibrations as well as quantitative and nonquantitative source-response checks. Examples are provided of accepted methods for determining appropriate calibration intervals based on records of instrument response. The recommendations are intended for equipment that measures count rate, exposure rate, or accumulated dose from external gamma or beta sources, and do not address additional capabilities such as alpha or neutron detection or radionuclide identification.
The tiered approach allows users to attain confidence in their equipment while working within available funding and personnel resources. It recognizes that a functional instrument, even if not formally calibrated, can still support certain missions during a large-scale emergency and is preferred to an absence of instrumentation.
LLNL-ABS-844798
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MAM-D.4
10:30 Break
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MAM-D.5
10:50 Exacting the Science of Emergency Preparedness TR Smith*, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Abstract: Radiological emergency preparedness ensures protective actions can and will be taken in the event of a radiological release. As an overarching principle, protective actions should do more good than harm. Evacuation and sheltering-in-place are relied on in an emergency to provide protection from radiation, but the choice of protective action is far from an exact science. Evacuation has long been considered the principle protective action to avoid or reduce dose in the event of a radiological release. But evacuation is not without its own risk. A recent meta-analysis of emergency events reveals that displaced populations are more likely to experience negative nonradiological health outcomes as a result of prolonged evacuation or relocation. As an alternative to evacuation, sheltering-in-place has been shown to be more protective than once understood. Furthermore, there may be lessons for effective use of shelters to protect from nonradiological airborne contaminants that can be applied to radiological emergencies. In addition, advances in consequence analysis tools and modeling have provided new risk-insights into severe accident phenomena that form part of the basis for protective action strategies. This session will explore the risks associated with protective actions and the science that will inform protective action strategies for decision-makers and the public.
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MAM-D.6
11:10 New Airborne Radio-Iodine InSitu Spectroscopic Analysis Methods for Routine and Emergency Applications FL Bronson*, Mirion Technologies - Canberra
; Fr Bronson
Abstract: Radio-Iodines, are a major concern for workers around reactor and research facilities or for the general population following a reactor incident. The historical method is pulling a volume of air past an adsorber, a simple field count with a simple portable instrument, and then a laboratory gamma spectral assay. Today, near-laboratory quality results can be obtained in the field, with immediate nuclide-specific results. Nuclide-specific results are important since there are three major Iodine nuclides involved in fission accidents each with their own dose conversion factors, and to differentiate the Iodine from the radio-Xenon gasses that adsorb to the collection media. For these applications, a small CZT detector is especially useful due to size, energy resolution, and power consumption. The detector and shield are connected to a touch-panel console containing the Mirion Data Analyst. The operator just inserts the collected filter sample, presses a button to start the spectral assay, and views the nuclide results and any associated alarms. For real-time monitoring, a sample pump is added to the shield, along with a special algorithm for differential analysis of the buildup on the filter.
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MAM-D.7
11:30 Lung counting efficiency and chest-wall thickness correction for in-vivo assay triage of inhaled radionuclides V Wei*, Georgia Institute of Technology
; S Dewji, Georgia Institute of Technology
Abstract: Warfighters and military personnel may inhale radiation contamination from radiological dispersal devices, improvised nuclear devices and reactor releases, which may result in internalized uptakes of gamma-ray-emitting radionuclides that require field triage in-vivo assay. Human chest wall thickness (CWT) varies greatly depending on body size, gender, race, etc., and a direct measure of the CWT can be hard to obtain in triage scenarios. In order to improve the triage whole-body gamma-ray scanner measurement, a correlation between the Body Mass Index (BMI), chest girth or breast cup size for female, and CWT was established. A Monte Carlo model was constructed in the radiation transport code, PHITS, to simulate contamination in target organs of human with varying CWT. Laboratory benchmark measurements were conducted using tissue-equivalent slab phantoms to characterize counting efficiencies as a function of CWT and selected radionuclide energies. The ICRP 145 reference and UF expanded sex-specific anthropomorphic mesh-type phantom models were employed, and by altering the combination and positions of multiple NaI(Tl) scintillation detectors and factoring the variability in organ sizes of models with different BMIs in PHITS, a quantified relationship was introduced to account for morphology on counting efficiency. The computed results were validated experimentally using the ATOM human phantoms and a series of radiation detectors. Integrated with biokinetic uptake in target organs of each radionuclide at different CWTs, the counting efficiency coefficients were corrected by a multi-order mathematical model to compensate the variance in the non-reference phantoms. The results were compared to published data and showed solid improvement on counting efficiency from previous studies.
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MAM-D.8
11:50 DOE Consequence Management Vision BD Hunt*, Sandia National Labs
Abstract: The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nuclear Incident Response’s Consequence Management (CM) Program develops and maintains rapidly-deployable equipment and technical expertise for world-wide response to nuclear and radiological incidents. The CM mission is to provide timely, scientifically defensible, operationally relevant, and actionable decision support to authorities responsible for protection of the public, responders, and the environment affected by a nuclear or radiological incident. This mission is performed in support of the interagency Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). We realize our mission through partnerships with: DOE/NNSA Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.
Our vision is for CM to directly utilize their expertise to provide federal, state, local, and tribal decision makers with a holistic and actionable understanding of the potential human health and environmental impact during a nuclear or radiological incident. This envisioned future state would close gaps in CM’s ability to efficiently synthesize data into actionable recommendations and provide accessible information for audiences with varying interests and/or experience responding to nuclear and radiological incidents. By continuing to evolve CM’s data collection and assessment methods, we will maintain our world-class leadership in radiological consequence management.
The goal of this presentation is to inform our partners in radiological emergency response of our initial planning steps and goals, to solicit feedback, and to establish cooperative relationships to achieve our vision for providing the best possible support during radiological emergencies.
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