WPM-D - Emergency Response and Homeland Security Woodrow Wilson D 14:30 - 17:00
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| Chair(s): Edward Waller, Andrea DiCarlo
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WPM-D.1
14:30 Optimization of Radiation Protection in Emergency Planning: What does this actually mean? EJ Waller*, Ontario Tech University
; Ed Waller
Abstract: The International Commission on Radiological Protection's three fundamental principles of radiological protection are justification, optimization, and dose limitation. While justification and dose limitation are readily understandable and quantifiable, the concept of optimization is somewhat more abstract. Optimization is a straightforward high-level concept for a person to grasp - do more with less, last longer with the same power supply, maximize the benefit obtained from resources, etc. However, for technical problems, such as emergency planning, it is far more obtuse and challenging to quantify. Reduction of radiation exposure to levels below known physical and probabilistic health impacts is understandable, but when it is required to be balanced and optimized with other issues such as limited evacuation routes leading to high probability of traffic accidents, long term psychological impacts of an evacuation, mixed hazard environments from other effects like forest fires and other emergency situations, it is more challenging for the health physicist. The IAEA has encouraged Member States “to ensure that radiation protection strategies are developed, justified and optimized to enable effective protective actions to be taken in a timely manner, during a nuclear or radiological emergency” (https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/EPR-Protection_Strategy_web.pdf and specifically from GC(62)/RES/6,). There is a need for the elaboration of general overarching views and specific technical guidance on optimization during an emergency for health physicists to reference when they are required to provide input into this area. This presentation will explore the issue of optimization of radiation protection in emergency planning. We will discuss the concept of optimization and frame how it applies to different areas of nuclear emergency response planning. I will provide an overview of some of the most recent guidance that is related to this topic and ultimately discuss where short comings can be identified and suggest the type of scientific contributions that are needed in the health physics community to address this issue.
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WPM-D.2
14:45 Modelling the need for protective actions around Canadian nuclear generating stations L Bergman*, Health Canada
; E Waller, Ontario Tech U; K Buchanan, Health Canada; A Al Nasser, Health Canada; M Chakir, Health Canada
Abstract: Canada is a geographically diverse country with strong seasonal effects that can vary depending on location. As a result, Canadian nuclear generating stations, located in the Provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick, may experience the consequences of a nuclear accident differently due to their disparate locations and depending on when the accident takes place. A one-size-fits-all, internationally recommended, approach may not always allow for the optimization of resources. A greater understanding when, where and under what circumstances protective actions may or may not be required as a result of a nuclear emergency will assist all levels of emergency response organizations in developing plans and arrangements that address the unique situations that they may reasonably expect to encounter. To examine this, a severe nuclear accident was modelled using an advanced Lagrangian atmospheric dispersion model and meteorological data from a numerical weather prediction system at each of the nuclear generating stations in Canada. The model was run for daily results extending over the course of one-year. The preliminary results provide us with some insight into the distances to which protective actions may be required and how these may vary depending on location, season and time of day. Future plans to expand on this work will be described
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WPM-D.3
15:00 Radiation and Nuclear Countermeasures Program Efforts to Ensure Robust and Reproducible Dosimetry Throughout the Funded Portfolio and Beyond AL DiCarlo*, NIAID, NIH
; LA DeWerd, University of Wisconsin-Madison; K Kunugi, University of Wisconsin-Madison; MM Satyamitra, NIAID, NIH; CI Rios, NIAID, NIH; DR Cassatt, NIAID, NIH; O Molinar-Inglis, NIAID, NIH; LP Taliaferro, NIAID, NIH; TA Winters, NIAID, NIH
Abstract: Since 2004, the RNCP, within the NIH/NIAID, has supported grant and contract awards to researchers engaging in early through advanced development of diagnostics and therapeutics to address injuries sustained during a radiological or nuclear public health emergency. To characterize radiation damage caused to different organ systems, its detection by biomarker changes, and potential amelioration by medical countermeasures, the RNCP portfolio includes work in laboratory animal models ranging from mice to nonhuman primates across many institutions. To irradiate these models, researchers employ a broad array of machines and irradiation conditions (e.g., gamma- and X-rays, mixed fields, total- and partial-body). The need to increase access to and improve dosimetry standards and provide dose harmonization within the radiation biology community has been noted for over a decade. To continue to address this need, the RNCP initiated a centralized dosimetry assessment through a contract awarded in 2020 to the MRRC, which uses its associated Accredited Dosimetry Calibration Laboratory. This contract provides for expert dosimetry evaluation and consultation across the entire RNCP-funded portfolio. To date, this effort has provide evaluation and support for 15 radionuclide-based irradiators (137Cs and 60Co) and 18 cabinet-type orthovoltage X-ray irradiators at more than 20 institutions. To further advance the concept of enabling a more robust understanding of the parameters of experiments involving radiation, the RNCP also held a meeting in early 2023 with global dosimetry subject matter experts and key radiation journal editors to explore the possibility of adding specific journal instructions to authors, and to consider the conduct of an international dosimetry assessment exercise. These efforts, which could also include a commentary to be included in multiple publications, add to work by others to shine light again on this central concern in the radiation community.
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WPM-D.4
15:15 Secondary Effects of Water Contamination on Communities and Industry GG Adams*, Gryphon Scientific
; EM Becker, PNNL
Abstract: Following a major nuclear or radiological incident, it is almost inevitable that surface waterways will become contaminated by radioactive material either directly or indirectly (e.g., runoff). In turn, community water systems may become contaminated as well. While a great deal of effort has been focused on the human risks from contaminated water, including ingestion, there are many gaps in our understanding of the secondary effects contaminated water may have on communities and industry. Outside of drinking water, there are no recommended thresholds for other water uses such as recreational swimming, boating, or fishing. In industry, use of contaminated water in industrial cooling may result in the buildup of radioactive material in cooling systems. Further, in some cases water is used to cool industrial products directly, such as iron. If contaminated water was used cool iron, for example, the iron product would become contaminated, potentially posing a hazard to both ironworkers and the consumer. Water is also used by every critical infrastructure sector from agriculture to power production. Understanding what contamination thresholds are necessary to protect each sector is critical to a holistic radiological or nuclear response and recovery. Given the extreme demands on health physicists and other radiation experts following a major nuclear or radiological incident, there is value in identifying likely issues and developing recommended thresholds before an incident occurs. This presentation will discuss this gap in more detail as well as potential solutions for closing or mitigating the issue.
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WPM-D.5
15:30 Break
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WPM-D.6
16:00 SOURCE TERM VERIFICATION FOR RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS FOR THE 1L TARGET FACILITY AT THE LOS ALAMOS NEUTRON SCIENCE CENTER (LANSCE) JL Gerard*, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract: This presentation covers a case study conducted to accurately quantify the radiological source term for the maximum credible incident (MCI) at the 1L Target Facility at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE).
The MCI for the 1L Target Facility is a loss of cooling capability to the 1L target and a failure to trip the accelerator causing the tungsten target to overheat and become vaporized. The radionuclide inventory radionuclide inventory was previously determined and used to develop the postulated source term listed in the Emergency planning and hazards assessment (EPHA). The EPHA allows for streamlined response in the event of an emergency and the source term is used by the Emergency Technical Support Center (ETSC) staff in modeling real-time radiological dispersion from the event.
The EPHA for the 1L Target Facility lists 2.81 239 Pu-eq Ci (plutonium equivalent Curies) and the emergency is classified as a site area emergency based on the Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guideline Manual (EPA PAG Manual). With this information emergency responders would assume alpha contamination to be released and the primary exposure pathway to be inhalation and the peak exposure time to be as the plume was passing.
After closer inspection of the accident scenario and radionuclide inventory is was found that, in fact, the release was orders of magnitude higher and made up of primarily beta and gamma emitting radionuclides. The updated source term was used to model the dispersion following the MCI at the 1L Target Facility of LANSCE and increase the emergency classification from a site area emergency to a general emergency. The updated source term also shows that ground shine is the primary pathway of exposure and that the exposure threat remains even after the plume has passed. This case study was used to make recommendations to ETSC staff on updating the associated EPHA.
Aside from the technical implications of an inaccurate source term in emergency response scenarios, there is also a valuable lesson learned in our responsibility to always have a questioning attitude to avoid complacency.
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WPM-D.7
16:15 DoD Detaille Opportunities to support the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office TJ Costeira*, Army / Department of Homeland Security
Abstract: The mission of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office is to lead DHS efforts and coordination of domestic and international partners to safeguard the United States against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and related threats. DHS CWMD Office and the Department of Defense for DoD Personnel Support have a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in place to provide DoD personnel to support the DHS CWMD Mission. The MOA is a vehicle for select DoD personnel to participate in broadening assignments within DHS CWD for a typical 3-year tour of duty. This presentation will introduce the programs and opportunities that a DoD detailee to the DHS CWMD Office, Operations Support Directorate will be integrated. Topics to be discussed will include an Introduction to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office Structure and Leadership, Strategic Lines of Effort, Detailee Opportunities and Requirements, Mobile Detection Deployment Units, Securing the Cities Program, Radiological / Nuclear Training and Exercise Examples.
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WPM-D.8
16:30 Evaluating the Radiological Dose from a Portable Neutron Material Assay System JM Rahon*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract: The re-emergence of the thorium fuel cycle for use in nuclear power generation will require the application of a robust safeguards regime to ensure party States adhere to their non-proliferation treaty obligations. The non-destructive assay of thorium-bearing fuel materials presents several new challenges not encountered in verification inspections for existing uranium and plutonium cycles, necessitating the development of new procedures and technologies. The use of neutrons as an interrogating particle is well established both for fissile-material quantification in safeguards and for myriad other forms of non-destructive material assay in manufacturing, mining, archaeology, defense, etc. Our group has proposed a novel portable neutron interrogation system for safeguards which leverages epithermal neutron resonance capture signals, yielding information about both fissile and non-fissile fuel constituents. To support the practicality assessment of such a system, a radiological dose map for a proposed portable configuration will be presented. We will describe the studies which verify the neutron and gamma dose rate created by a 10E8 neutron per second deuterium-tritium neutron generator, including values from an MCNP model and their experimental comparisons. Shielding geometry and field-use configurations will be presented, analysing ambient and operator dose in a proposed safeguards application. The impacts of shielding on the resonance analysis objective of the system, such as prompt inelastic neutron scatter and resonance capture gammas on shielding materials will also be discussed.
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WPM-D.9
16:45 Advanced Tools to Utilize in Large-Scale Radiological Contamination for Public Health and Safety S Mukhopadhyay*, Nevada National Security Site – Remote Sensing Laboratory
; P Guss; R Maurer
Abstract: The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) has the capability to deliver an agile and prompt
response that supports the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration
during pre- and post-radiological and nuclear emergencies of both national and international
concern. NNSS has a team of experts who are well versed in all aspects of nuclear
emergencies, including the use of advanced software tools for the characterization of
radiological contamination over large areas that encompass different types of terrains and land
use (e.g., urban, rural, agricultural, industrial). This presentation discusses the two most
common software tools used in large-area radiological consequence management. The first
includes web-based atmospheric dispersion and transport modeling capabilities for assessing
the health physics effects of nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological contaminant releases,
irrespective of cause. This is provided by the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
(NARAC) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The second is a stand-alone software
package developed by Sandia National Laboratories in support of the Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). This software, called Turbo FRMAC, implements
the radiological assessment methods documented in the FRMAC Assessment Manual and
performs calculations that guide the decision-making process of state, local, and tribal response
organizations. This presentation will demonstrate the NARAC tool’s capabilities to simulate and
assess atmospheric dispersion and ground deposition caused by a large-scale release from a
nuclear reactor. We also demonstrate, using Turbo FRMAC and the ground deposition isotope
densities from NARAC, how to calculate derived response and intervention levels to help
emergency response organizations make informed protective action decisions for workers and
the public (e.g., sheltering, evacuation, and relocation; food embargo).
This work was done by Mission Support and Test Services, LLC, under Contract No. DE-NA0003624 with
the U.S. Department of Energy. DOE/NV/0003624--1548.
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